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WILLIAM IAN MILLER 
"I CAN TAKE A HINT": 
SOCIAL INEPTITUDE, EMBARRASSMENT, 
AND THE KING OF COMEDY 
The phrase "I can take a hint," when said seriously, contains its own 
denial. It reveals that the speaker has not been very adept at recog-
nizing the hints already given, nor very graceful about not making a 
scene once he has recognized them. Its very utterance has the effect 
of punishing the hint-giver by making her hint fail as a hint. The 
truly successful hint works by gaining its end with no extra awk-
wardness added to the social encounter. The good hint should be 
barely perceived by the person toward whom it is directed. We 
could even say that it should not really become a part of his active 
consciousness. It should simply trigger a sense that it's time to go or 
that the line he is pursuing needs to be terminated. The good hint 
achieves the invisibility of the natural. 1 
People vary in their sensitivity to hints. The vast majority of us, in 
most settings, seem to pick up on them with reasonable facility. But 
we shouldn't be picking up on too many of them. That would be a 
sign of paranoia or self-loathing, if we are being hypersensitive, or a 
sign of how little we are in fact esteemed, if we are only middlingly 
sensitive. Yet we should worry if we are picking up on no hints. Few 
of us are so delightful all the time that we could never be the object 
of a distancing hint. It might be that our competence in reading 
signals is so habitual, so much a matter of second nature, that we are 
not conscious of the hints we discern and act upon properly. But it 
might also mean that we are being somewhat dense. 
We are hint-givers as well as hint-receivers. And this fact should 
help us hone our skills as hint-receivers. But not necessarily. Hints 
can be given with focused intention, or hints can just be read 
(rightly) into rather unfocused unconscious distancing signals. There 
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is no reason that the unconscious hint-giver need have any special 
aptitude for discerning when she is the object of someone else's hint. 
The person skilled in giving intended hints, however, should also be 
proficient in discerning when she is the object of someone else's hint. 
That skill is often what we think of as the very substance of good 
manners and tact, of refined social sensitivity. I am assuming, of 
course, that these hints are successful ones, that is, those that do 
their work anonymously. 
The situation needs to be complicated a little more by noting that 
hints whose failure has the capacity to produce scenes come in two 
varieties: those that are distancing, that reveal the hinter as wishing 
to be free of the other, and those that seek greater closeness, as in 
hints of sexual attraction, of continued social relations, of desires to 
give or receive gifts. Each type involves somewhat different social 
and psychological risks. The risk of making distancing hints is of 
giving offense and the attendant awkwardnesses that accompany 
giving offense: embarrassment, regret, maybe even guilt and 
remorse. The risks of making hints of desired contact are the risks of 
rejection and its attendant pains: as before, embarrassment, but 
more seriously and centrally, humiliation, shame, chagrin, indigna-
tion and resentment. Both hints of distance and closeness tend to 
establish a moral and social hierarchy in which the distancer or the 
desired one has a higher status. There is a certain moral economy 
here. The two types of hint often appear in tandem: the hint of 
closeness, not unusually, provokes hints to keep away, while the 
distancing hint often prompts desperate and pathetic hints of close-
ness and reassurance from the rejected party. It is clear that a certain 
right inheres in the distancing position, a right to be free of relations 
not consented to. 2 The person seeking closeness is always cast in the 
role of a seeker of favors, or more accurately, of the other's consent 
to have her social spaces intruded upon. 
The structure of this moral economy means that, somewhat per-
versely, we are inclined to find the seeker of closeness to be more off-
putting than we are to find the distancer off-putting. Social obtuse-
ness in the former produces in others contempt, disgust, annoyance, 
emotions that motivate removal and distancing; social ineptness in 
the distancer produces hatred, indignation, resentment, emotions 
that, though hostile, impel us to get closer even if only to wreak 
havoc or take vengeance. The seeker of closeness is thus a nudnick, a 
nerd, a creep, a dork, a schnorrer (Yiddish seems to make a myriad 
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of refined distinctions in this social type), and more recently, a 
harasser or a stalker; the distancer is rude, boorish, a cold fish, or 
more charitably, shy or reserved. Ineptness in the distancer is not, 
however, simply a matter of giving offense. There is another kind of 
ineptness: failing to keep others off, being too accessible. Thus the 
patsy, pushover, chump, on the one hand, or the gracious, sweet, 
long-suffering soul on the other. Gender figures in this also. We 
usually envisage men as more likely to violate the norms of distance 
than women: it is men who are usually treated to epithets like nerd 
and creep. A woman who doesn't pick up on distancing signals 
might be pushy, or aggressive, whiny or dependent, but not a dork 
or a nudnick. Men, on the other hand, are cut more slack for being 
rude as distancers than woman are, even though women are caught 
in the double bind of being condemned both for not being circum-
spect enough about men approaching them and for not being gener-
ally more welcoming when appreciated. 
"I can take a hint," as I indicated above, is already a sign that a 
hint has not succeeded in doing its work without social disruption, 
that is, without giving offense and without that offense becoming 
the basis for "making a scene," for "I can take a hint" makes a scene. 
It is the indignant response of someone who feels that he hasn't been 
treated to the respect he feels himself entitled to. But if indignation 
is the emotion of the nudnick who finally gets the message, embar-
rassment and mortification, or a more generalized sensation of awk-
wardness, are likely to characterize the emotional position of the 
hinter and observers of the scene. Embarrassment figures more insis-
tently in the world of hints than just as a response to making a scene. 
The inept reader of distancing signals embarrasses us even before he 
must be disciplined by being forced to "get the hint" or "get the 
message." It is his denseness that makes the situation awkward for 
others long before it degenerates into a "scene." 
This is a long prologue to a tale which I must make a bit longer 
still, for the failure of hints and the embarrassment generated by 
inept hint takers are the central motifs of The King of Comedy, 
which is my subject in this essay. Let me sketch briefly some salient 
features of embarrassment. It has been observed that embarrass-
ment and certain closely related sensations of awkwardness and 
social discomfort can be experienced vicariously. We can feel embar-
rassed on someone's behalf even though that person does not feel 
embarrassed but, as our own sensations judge, should feel so. This 
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allows us to experience a doubling of the embarrassment. Not only 
do we feel the embarrassment we would feel if we were in Rupert 
Pupkin's predicament, but we also sympathize with the embarrass-
ment that Rupert's ineptitude has caused the other party. In fact, it 
is this latter embarrassment that triggers the former. Because Rupert 
embarrasses others, we imagine to our own embarrassment what it 
would be like to be so embarrassing and so dim as not to have 
perceived we were. 
Embarrassment is also contagious; that is, we can catch it from 
another who does feel it. In these instances it is not the case that we 
are feeling embarrassed by what the other is feeling embarrassed 
by- that would simply be another example of vicarious embarrass-
ment. The contagion of embarrassment is a function of the fact that 
the display of embarrassment can itself be embarrassing. Embar-
rassment can thus feed on itself, producing more embarrassment in 
the embarrassed person who now can add the embarrassment of a 
loss of poise to whatever failings gave rise to the initial embarrass-
ment. The manifest embarrassment of another also embarrasses oth-
ers who witness it. Blushes produce blushes because embarrassment 
makes demands on our tact which we are not always up to. Do we 
pretend not to notice? Do we notice and say something to defuse the 
situation? Or does our embarrassment at their embarrassment do 
just the right thing by making us a community of equals again? 
Embarrassment, it has been observed, is not only disruptive of a 
smooth social order; it is called upon in many situations to do the 
remedial work of restoring smoothness to a disturbed social setting. 3 
Embarrassment works, as we all well know, to effect apology, to 
make amends for our gaffes and awkwardnesses. In fact, if we are 
not embarrassed or embarrassable we are unlikely also to be very 
adept at picking up on the distancing signals that others give us. 
There lurks here an issue which may be of special interest to film 
theorists: the process by which the viewer develops identifications 
with characters, themes, or the camera's eye might vary with the 
particular emotion at stake. Certain depicted emotions, like embar-
rassment, because contagious and vicariously experienceable, 
prompt the reproduction of themselves in the viewer; other emotions 
cannot reproduce themselves. Compare, for instance, jealousy: one 
does not feel jealous on someone else's behalf. We can sympathize 
with their jealousy or understand it, but we do not feel it. In this 
regard, it is unlike embarrassment. Any theory of the identificatory 
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process in film will remain forever oversimplified without a more 
detailed consideration of how spectator sympathy works in conjunc-
tion with different kinds of emotions. 
Embarrassment is an emotion that has a strangely insistent con-
nection with laughter and comedy. We might think of embarrass-
ment as occupying the middle ground between humiliation on its 
dark side and amusement on its light side. Embarrassing incidents 
are the same things that provide mirth to observers and even to the 
poor embarrassed soul within hours or days of the event. Embarrass-
ing events are thus distinguishable from humiliating ones. We will 
regale others to our own and their delight with our embarrassments, 
but we will guard our humiliations and reveal them to no one unless 
we are engaged in certain ritualized degradations like confession or 
psychoanalysis. 4 Yet humiliation too partakes of the comic world, 
for our humiliations often occur to the delight of others, producing 
in them Hobbes's "sudden glory"5 and the gray mirth of Schaden-
freude. 
The emotion we name amusement, 6 and by this I mean the feeling 
that we have in response to things deemed humorous rather than the 
sense of amusement as when we say we amuse ourselves by playing 
basketball, seems to find in the embarrassing much of the occasion 
for its elicitation. Not only is it that the same events that are embar-
rassing can with a slight shift of perspective also appear amusing, 
but also that embarrassment itself provides amusement, if not to the 
embarrassed person then surely to others. But this is tricky, for we 
think of embarrassment as an unpleasant emotion; indeed it is suffi-
ciently painful to provide much of the discipline and threat that 
keeps us functioning as mannerly and sociably presentable people. 
Embarrassing situations are embarrassing for all concerned, the one 
who embarrasses, the one who is embarrassed by the one who 
embarrasses, and those that witness the spectacle. At some level 
watching others make fools of themselves is painful. We do not want 
our humanity so utterly vulnerable, our bases for self-respect so 
fragile. Yet it is precisely the fragile basis of our respectability that 
produces the comic: what is a clown, what are the grotesque, slap-
stick, black humor, burlesque, if not the spectacle of our ineffable 
foolishness? We are dealing here, rather obviously, with some pretty 
deep-seated ironies of the social and psychological. 7 
Here I note as an aside that it has been a commonplace of literary 
theory since Aristotle that certain emotional experiences in the 
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observer may be as constitutive of a particular artistic genre as its 
other formal generic structures. Aristotle was clearly onto something 
when he made the elicitation of certain emotions the signature of 
tragedy. We have even come to the point where we categorize films 
by the emotions we expect them to elicit: horror film is named after 
a type of fear, revenge films engage the passion of vengefulness and 
its close associates: indignation, resentment, and the satisfaction of 
justice done. Tearjerkers often elicit a range of emotions from wist-
fulness to pity. Action films exhilarate and partake of aspects of 
apprehension, revenge and horror. We would need to distinguish 
more precisely the differences between the emotion we experience as 
an observer of a fictional representation from the one we give the 
same name when the representation is not fictional or to the one we 
say we feel when we are one of the principal actors. We would also 
want to recognize that our precise emotional responses depend to 
some extent on what we figure the emotional situation of the 
observed party to be. Thus the apprehension we experience in hor-
ror films may well have a different structure depending, say, on 
whether the character in the film is also experiencing fear and terror 
or whether she is blithely oblivious to the danger that lurks behind 
the closet door. 
Embarrassment and amusement also share some of the same 
somatic features. Laughter, central to the bodily presentation of 
amusement, is no stranger to embarrassment either, although dis-
tinctly less central than blushing. Laughter, as we all know, can 
mark a variety of psychic, social, and somatic states: embarrass-
ment, malice, contempt, joy, anxiety, awkwardness, getting tickled, 
being amused, or simply supplying the necessary signs of engage-
ment in amiable conversation. It may be that these states share 
nothing more than the fact that they all can trigger laughter. Is there 
anything really similar between the awkward laughter of embar-
rassment, and the laughter of genuine amusement? It is never too 
difficult to tell one from the other. Yet they are both laughters; they 
are not different genera, but species within a genus and they share a 
certain common relation with the ridiculous, the ludicrous, the 
humiliating, and the embarrassing, and the comic universe in which 
they thrive. 
Like laughter, comedy cuts across a number of emotional 
domains. Comic laughter is not only the laughter of amiability. 
Most any laugh provoked by the comic (we may thus except the 
WILLIAM IAN MILLER 329 
laugh of being tickled) is over-determined: part nervous, part "sud-
den glory," part just joining with others who are laughing, part 
amusement and mirth and part relief in the style of "oh please be 
funny enough, so that I don't have to feel embarrassed by your not 
being funny." This last item is surely some of what motivates laugh-
ter at the performances of that most vulnerable of souls, the stand-
up comedian, the modern clown. Is it possible to separate our fear of 
his embarrassing us by his being embarrassing from the total experi-
ence of the comedy? Consider the emotions elicited by observing an 
unfunny comedian, something we will take up again shortly when 
we meet Rupert Pupkin. If humiliation lies in pretending to bigger 
shoes than you can fill, then the unfunny comedian humiliates him-
self and one of the sure indications that you are watching someone 
humiliate himself is that you will be embarrassed by the display. 
* * * 
Embarrassment, comedy, stand-up comedians, and the norms of 
respectable and competent social behavior, especially as these have 
to do with the practices surrounding leave taking, conversation and 
interaction closure all come together in Martin Scorsese's under-
appreciated classic, The King of Comedy. 8 The movie, according to 
press critics and Scorsese in interviews, is about the American obses-
sion with celebrity. The film presents the story of Rupert Pupkin's 
obsessive drive to get his break on network television as a stand-up 
comedian. Rupert (Robert De Niro) is a pathetic 34 year-old messen-
ger boy who enjoys an active fantasy life imagining himself the host 
of his own talk show which he stages in a room of the house he shares 
with his mother amidst life-size cardboard cutouts of Liza Minelli 
and Jerry Lewis. 9 Jerry Lewis plays Jerry Langford, the popular 
host of a late night talk show and the object of Rupert's emulation 
and fixation. One night Rupert insinuates himself into Jerry's car 
after having helped him brave a throng of autograph hounds and 
groupies like himself; he confesses his ambitions to Jerry, asks Jerry if 
he would listen to his act, and extracts from him an unfelt concession 
to contact his office. The film then treats us to the painful experi-
ence of Rupert's numerous attempts to see Jerry as he remains oblivi-
ous to the rebuffs and brush-offs from Jerry's staff people. Inter-
spersed with scenes of Rupert cooling his heels in the reception area 
of Jerry's office are Rupert's fantasies: Jerry begging Rupert to take 
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over his show, Jerry declaring Rupert a comic genius, Rupert getting 
married on the Langford show to Rita, a bartender who was once 
the object of Rupert's fantasies from afar when they were in high 
school. Pursuant to Jerry's invitation in one of these fantasies to visit 
Jerry's summer home, Rupert actually shows up with Rita and is 
rudely sent packing. In the next scene, Rupert, with the assistance of 
another psychotic Langford fan, Masha (Sandra Bernhard), kidnaps 
Jerry and the end of it all is that Rupert uses Jerry as a hostage to 
secure his own appearance on Jerry's show after which he blithely 
goes off to jail, but not before he, we, and Rita view his monologue 
on network TV in Rita's bar. The movie closes with various voice-
overs in the style of the evening news in which we find that Rupert 
Pupkin's name has become a household word, that his performance 
was viewed by 87 million households, that he was sentenced to six 
years in the white collar minimum security facility in Allenwood, 
PA, that Rupert's memoirs have been purchased by a New York 
publishing house for more than a million dollars, that Rupert was 
released after serving two years and nine months of his sentence, 
that his best-selling autobiography will be appearing as a major 
motion picture. And in the final scene the resonant voice of an 
announcer introduces the one and only King of Comedy Rupert 
Pupkin who now has his own network show. "Rupert Pupkin, ladies 
and gentlemen, let's hear it for Rupert Pupkin. Wonderful. Rupert 
Pupkin, ladies and gentlemen. Rupert Pupkin, ladies and gentle-
men. Let's hear it for Rupert Pupkin. Wonderful. Rupert Pupkin, 
ladies and gentlemen." 
Let me touch on a few small items before taking up the issues of 
misreading social cues and the emotional responses such misreadings 
provoke that are so central to the movie's feel. Rupert loves his 
name; thus his first words to Jerry in the car: " ... my name is 
Rupert Pupkin and I know the name doesn't mean very much to you 
but it means an awful lot to me. Believe me." At some level he seems 
to know it may be his best joke. He leads with it when he gives his 
comedy routine, even after it has been given by the announcer. 
Names, some think, dictate our destiny. Rupert's surely dictates his. 
It takes a very special person to overcome a name. Nerdy names go a 
long way to making their bearers nerds. In any event, the movie 
industry operates on such an assumption, for if names can't quite 
make a star, they surely can prevent one from being born. We thus 
have Clark Gable and Rock Hudson, names which have a style every 
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bit as parodiable as the names we give residential subdivisions. 
Could Rupert possibly be a skilled social actor with such a name? He 
does not disappoint our expectations. 
The movie ends by obsessing on Rupert's name and getting it 
right, something no one but Rupert in the movie does. To others he 
is Mr. Pumpkin, Mr. Puffer, Mr. Pipkin, Mr. Pubnik, Mr. Krupkin, 
Mr. Potkin, etc. Together with the improbable number of house-
holds (the entire US) viewing Rupert's night on the Langford show, 
this repetition of his correct name by someone other than himself, 
presented somewhat slower than it would be in reality, is a very 
insistent indication that the extravagant news items and voice-overs 
at the end of the film are just another one of Rupert's fantasies. 
Critics have taken it straight, some going so far as to chastise Scor-
sese's irresponsibility in depicting the rewards obtainable by crimi-
nal devotion to celebrity. 10 In the beginning of the film Rupert's 
fantasies are clearly marked as such. When Jerry finally extricates 
himself from Rupert after their first encounter, Rupert falls into 
reverie and the scene breaks to Jerry and Rupert having lunch. Here 
it is Jerry who is importuning a reluctant Rupert to take over his 
show for six weeks which a self-satisfied Rupert deigns to do. Scor-
sese makes sure we do not mistake the reverie for reality by breaking 
to Rupert in his room acting the part of Rupert in the fantasy. 
Rupert must even suffer the indignity of his mother's off-screen 
interruptions ("What are you doing down there so late?"). It is strik-
ing that the Rupert of the fantasy speaks with more reserve (but still 
it is a reserve with many indicia of "showbiz" vulgar) and less vol-
ume than he is actually uttering the lines in his room. We thus see 
explicitly the metamorphosis Rupert's self-conception effects on the 
raw reality of Rupert's self that others see. Rupert does not hear 
himself as others hear him, nor does he see himself as others see him. 
Maybe. There is more than an occasional indication that Rupert is 
not without some strange access to insightful self-knowledge, of 
which more anon. 
If the reality of the final scene is less obviously the stuff of fantasy, 
that is only because Rupert and the movie have insistently moved to 
make his fantasy and his reality converge into a kind of "fan-reality" 
in which fans become the performers. Earlier fantasies were clearly 
signaled as such, but now we, like Rupert, are not sure anymore 
where fantasy ends and reality begins. This is a film that delights in 
all kinds of ambiguities that arise when the boundaries between 
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It's fantasy time as Rupert daydreams doing lunch with talk-show host Jerry 
Langford (Jerry Lewis). 
reality and fantasy, play-acting and playing at acting, television and 
life, good jokes and bad jokes, are not clearly demarcated. Was 
Rupert's monologue supposed to be funny or supposed to be bad? 
The critics split on this question, as have people I have polled; even 
Scorsese and De Niro split, the former thinking it weak, the latter 
thinking it great. 11 Ambiguities and ambivalences figure in the cast-
ing. We thus have dramatic actors such as De Niro trying to do 
comedy just as Rupert Pupkin is trying to do comedy and as De Niro 
as Jake LaMotta did comedy at the conclusion of Raging Bull, Scor-
sese's film before The King of Comedy. Sandra Bernhard, a stand-
up comic, gets her acting debut as a dramatic actress. Tony Randall, 
Victor Borge, Joyce Brothers play themselves, but they are not just 
being themselves, but playing themselves, self-enacting. And if De 
Niro is remarkable because he seems to come less determined by his 
prior roles than most big stars, less encumbered with the sludge of 
his public person, the opposite is the case with Jerry Lewis, about 
whom no one does not have an opinion, and, unless French, usually 
a negative one. Lewis is a comedian playing a dramatic role, but 
WILLIAM IAN MILLER 333 
playing a comic in that role. Lewis figures greatly in what I take to 
be one of the central implicit issues raised by the film: the unfunny 
comedian, the generally inept social actor, and the embarrassed 
discomfort he creates in his auditors. For every occasion someone 
might have actually laughed at Lewis one has cringed in embarrass-
ment at least three times. The real Lewis, in other words, has caused 
us almost as much discomfort as Rupert will cause us. 
Rupert's fantasies are wonderful stuff. They are pure wish-
fulfillment, but they are not ends in themselves; rather they moti-
vate Rupert to actualize them. The strength of his fantasies seems to 
overwhelm the embattled reality of others. When Jerry, in a desper-
ate attempt to bring closure to Rupert's verbal barrage in the car, 
tells Rupert to call his office and ask for his secretary, Rupert replies: 
"You know how many times I had this conversation in my head? 
This is beautiful." Jerry responds with cool patronizing contempt: 
"And did it always turn out this way?" Rupert: "Yeah, it did." Later, 
he goes to Jerry's summer home with Rita because Jerry, in a fan-
tasy, invited him. In these fantasies Rupert, more successfully than 
he can in real life, adopts Jerry's cool competence, while Jerry is 
reduced to acting like Rupert (or the real Jerry Lewis) as he fawns, 
importunes, and tells lame jokes. Yet Rupert's visions are indelibly 
Rupert's, still manifesting tastelessness and bad social judgment. In 
one he imagines his high school principal as a special guest on the 
Langford show, called there to pay homage to Rupert and marry 
him to Rita on national television. The taste mimics the tackiness of 
Tiny Tim but reproduces it as something to aspire to rather than to 
parody (as even Tim was able to do). And the irredeemability of his 
smallness of character manifests itself in the apology his vision 
extracts from the principal on behalf of all those who made Rupert's 
high school life miserable. Rupert thus constructs humiliation rituals 
(pathetic ones in the form of fantasized apology and deference) for 
others as a source of his pleasure. At dinner with Rita, Rupert links 
himself with one well-attested Christian tradition which makes the 
joys of heaven the delight of watching the pains of the damned in 
hell. He paints Rita a future of bliss in which they will be able to 
"look down on everybody and yell, 'Hey, tough luck, suckers. Better 
luck next time.' " 
Triumph is the contempt of losers for losers, Nietzschean ressenti-
ment writ small. Rupert thus consistently manifests contempt not 
only for Masha but for the other autograph seekers outside Jerry's 
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studio. But there is something about Rupert's sheer obliviousness 
that makes him an object of a kind of reluctant awe. Don't we root 
for him because his triumph will come at Langford/Lewis's expense? 
Our willingness to discover appealing characteristics in this psy-
chotic nebbish is not quite separable from the fact that he annoys 
Jerry Langford, someone for whom we have as little love as we do 
for the actor who plays him. Thus do we participate in Rupert's 
Schadenfreude. 
Rupert is so inept that his ineptitude produces perverse conse-
quences, that is, ones that cannot readily be distinguished from 
aptitude. De Niro's Rupert is a wonderfully subtle portrait of some-
one who lacks subtlety, who gets all the little things wrong and 
misreads everyone else's hints and cues. His hair, his dress, his body 
posture, his facial posture, his verbal and tonal tics all capture pre-
cisely someone who just doesn't quite get it. The remarkable thing 
about human sociability is how subtle we are in discerning the 
slightest deviation in these matters. But Rupert lacks key compo-
nents of this competence: he is largely clueless. We need, however, 
to distinguish between at least two kinds of clueless person: the one 
who is simply oblivious and the one who at some level of conscious-
ness uses his ineptitude strategically. 12 We all know cases of each. 
The difficult matter is what kind of consciousness to attribute to the 
latter. They are not sufficiently clued in to have the ability to 
become properly socialized, yet they are not without some aware-
ness that the offenses they give others get results. Others back off, 
others don't want to make scenes, others are too well socialized to be 
so rude as to call them on their rudeness, their intrusiveness, their 
boringness, boorishness, etc. rrhese are the people who prey off the 
general sociability of the majority. Yet it would be hard to attribute 
to them the classic mentality of the predator: that preternatural 
hyperawareness of each move of its would-be victim. The Ruperts of 
the world are not subtle hunters, nor are they generally cruel in a 
focused way. Such persons don't pretend, convincingly that is, not to 
want what they want; in this they are unlike the predator who 
studies how not to tip off danger alarms in his prey. 13 Yet at some 
level of consciousness they are not displeased with the consequences 
of their behavior. In straight economic terms the cost of their nerdi-
ness, the cost of their violating all these myriad of social norms, does 
not outweigh the benefits they obtain by violating them. 
Rupert is at different times both kinds of clueless. He really does 
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think the excruciatingly awful jokes he tells are funny. He thinks the 
picture of his Pride and Joy, a card picturing the household products 
of the same names, is witty. Yet at the same time he is not without 
awareness that the way to get where he wants to go is to make it very 
uncomfortable for others not to let him get there. But only some of 
the time, for his fantasies do not make him the best of cold rational 
actors. He does, after all, overplay his hand by showing up at Jerry's 
summer home for the weekend with Rita in tow. That blunder 
finally provokes Jerry into making a scene of his own, the one in 
which Rupert finally acknowledges that he can take a hint. And 
when the violation of little norms won't get Rupert where he wants 
to go, he shows little reluctance at violating big ones, such as kid-
napping laws. It is not without interest that the movie cuts from 
Rupert's finally admitting he can take a hint at Jerry's place to him 
and Masha in the car with the toy gun waiting to abduct Jerry. 
There is in this another clue as to what constitutes so much of the 
offensiveness of the socially clueless person, whether instrumentally 
so or not: clueless people are not forgiving of other people's similar 
lack of competence. Masha embarrasses Rupert as he does her; Rita 
embarrasses Rupert when she makes herself a little too at ease at 
Jerry's before Jerry arrives, putting on the record player ("You really 
shouldn't put that on, you know; it's not polite.") or when she takes 
herself on a sightseeing expedition upstairs ("No, Rita, I ... No, 
Rita, I wouldn't go up there. Rita. Rita, Rita. I don't think it's a 
good idea .... Rita, I don't think you have the right to go upstairs. 
Rita, please, don't go up ... Rita."). Rupert's incompetence is not a 
general incapacity to feel embarrassment, or even a lack of knowl-
edge of broad ranges of appropriate behavior. It is just that he can 
only feel embarrassed by another and only recognizes inappropriate 
behavior when it is someone else's. Thus it is that Rupert will bra-
zenly maintain to Masha that he didn't get thrown out of the build-
ing in which Jerry's office is located even though she saw him get 
unceremoniously chucked out by two security guards. To Rupert's 
mind the grossest violations of the norms of appropriate social inter-
action are Jerry's, not his. 14 Jerry's tact fails him and thus is Rupert 
forced to have to take a hint: 
Jerry: You understand English? Take your things and go. 
Rupert: All right, all right. I can take a hint, Jerry. I just want 
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to ask you if you'll listen to my stuff for fifteen minutes, that's all. 
Is that asking too much? 
Jerry: Yes, it is. I have a life, okay? 
Rupert: Well, I have a life too. 
Jerry: That's not my responsibility. 
Rupert: Well, it is when you tell me to call you and then you 
don't .... 
Jerry: I told you to call to get rid of you. 
Rupert: To get rid of me? 
Jerry: That's right. 
Rupert: Okay. All right, I can take a hint. 
Jerry: If I didn't tell you that, we'd still be standing on the steps 
of my apartment. 
Rupert will not suffer such rude treatment and he now feels justified 
in taking revenge. 
An actor of less genius would have made this movie into the satire 
on celebrity that at one level it is and nothing more. 15 But with De 
Niro doing Pupkin we have a serious piece of social psychology, the 
kind of insightful comedy of manners we rarely find except in the 
best novels. His Rupert is a master of using the form of apology as a 
conversational wedge: "Jerry, I'm sorry. I don't mean to disturb you. 
I just want to talk to you for a minute." His "I'm sorrys" are frequent 
and they are always of the preemptive variety, never designed to 
remedy a wrong done, but to introduce and defuse an offense about 
to be given. Other instances in this genre are the "I don't mean to 
bother you but ... " or his "Really, I don't mind" to Jerry's vexed 
administrative assistant which skillfully traverses any suggestion 
that he shouldn't wait around any longer. With the passive aggres-
sion of his use of the apology, there is the excessive thank-youing of 
desperate, but not to be denied, obsequiousness; hands are shaken 
too often and held too long. First names are used excessively and De 
Niro gets the style of intrusive familiarity exactly right: he drops 
Jerry's name to others while in Jerry's presence it becomes a mantra, 
a magic charm intended to counteract Jerry's desperate efforts at 
closing their encounter: "Thanks Jerry, thanks. Thanks a lot. It's a 
pleasure meeting you Jerry .... Jerry, Jerry, let me show you a 
picture of my Pride and Joy .... Jerry, seriously, if you ever want 
lunch, my treat." De Niro gets the accompanying body movements, 
smiles, tones, and rhythms exactly right in their wrongness. 
More than thirty minutes of the film are taken up watching 
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Rupert trying to get by Jerry's staff to Jerry. He is subjected to every 
kind of distancing move imaginable and we feel awkward suffering 
not only vicarious embarrassment and vicarious pain of rejection, 
but embarrassment for the staff people whom his cluelessness puts in 
awkward situations. His phone calls are not returned. There is no 
record of his appointment. Receptionists don't recall talking to him 
and as mentioned, no one gets his name right. And Rupert, true to 
form, does not get the message or take the hint. Instead he waits 
until they and we can't bear it. He is willing to endure the awkward-
ness of waiting in a reception area that he and we are told is not a 
waiting room. Even Rupert, we should note, experiences the minor 
awkwardnesses of trying to maintain "normal appearances," trying 
to enact oneself acting normal. So Rupert doesn't quite know where 
to rest his eyes or which way to cross his feet or what expression he 
should wear on his face as he waits. 16 He tries various postures, never 
holding any of them long enough to do the work of enacting one's 
normal self very successfully. He cranes his neck back and looks at 
the ceiling with a quizzical air: "Is that cork?" he says after what to 
us and the poor receptionist seems like an eternity. She: "I don't 
know what it is. Is it dripping on you?" He: "No. I was looking at 
the patterns. You know cork is good for sound .... It's very quiet in 
here." Rupert's ineptness is complex. It is not that he does not feel 
awkward, it is not that he does not know about trying to act normal, 
it is not that silence doesn't bother him, or that he feels out of place 
in some settings, it is that he totally botches how to remedy the 
awkwardnesses he feels so as to help others avoid feeling awkward 
for his incompetence. 
Missing cues and not taking hints without making scenes: I would 
say I was riding my own hobby horse and not the movie's if it 
weren't for one scene that seems to make the matter of missed cues 
the organizing metaphor for the film. Rupert has made up cue cards 
containing the message that Jerry, fake gun to his head, is to read 
over the phone to his producer. Rupert bungles the card turning: one 
card is blank, he turns two at once and has to go back, another is 
upside down. The broad comedy of this scene actually goes on 
longer than the burlesque-type joke warrants, but that too is 
emblematic of missing cues. No one has their timing right. Cues are 
missed, bungled, not read right and as a result people stay longer 
than they should, try things they have no business trying, etc. Not 
even the woman at the studio who is to turn the cards Rupert 
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penned for his intro times it right. Tony Randall, subbing for Jerry, 
has to call attention to the audience that his bad timing is her fault 
not his: "Turn it over please." Miscues and missed cues, Rupert's 
behavior in a nutshell. 
* * * 
Let me return to Rupert's monologue and take up again the mat-
ters I raised in the prologue of this essay: the relation of comedy to 
embarrassment and other emotions. If we laughed at the monologue 
(and I did), I suspect that no small motivator of that laughter was 
relief, particularly relief at being saved the embarrassment of wit-
nessing Rupert's humiliation if his routine turned out to be utterly 
awful. Whatever the case, his routine seems no worse than most 
stand-up comic fare but that is beside the point. More crucial is that 
Rupert's routine, by any measure, was nowhere near as bad as he 
had led us to believe it would be. We, after all, had cringed along 
with Jerry at the Pride and Joy card, the feeble attempts at wit at 
Jerry's (J: "You're a moron." R: ''Ordinarily I wouldn't allow any-
body to speak that way about Rita ... "), even the lame attempts in 
his fantasies ("Delores? That's my father's name."). Rupert has been 
the cause of making us feel uncomfortable and embarrassed both by 
and for him throughout the film. And in the end he spares us any 
further discomfort. Could it be that the King was simply softening 
us up so that with our low expectations he could only succeed on 
national TV? And what effect does casting Jerry Lewis as the suc-
cessful comedian Jerry Langford have ultimately on our expecta-
tions and standards of competence when it comes to comedians? 
There is an enormous literature on comedy, laughter, and humor. 
I do not want to get into its intricacies or its failure to develop 
interesting intricacies. I wish to set forth, by way of assertion and 
hypothesis, stated more strongly than may be justifiable, a few 
thoughts on the social psychology of stand-up comedy and Rupert. 
Rupert reveals that relief figures in our laughter at the comic more 
than we are likely to concede as a preliminary matter. Not relief 
from our own pent-up frustrations as in Freud's theory of jokes, but 
the emotion relief, the experience of having escaped a fate which we 
feared might materialize. 17 
Consider all those things that make us laugh at a comedian that 
have nothing to do with whether the routine is funny. We laugh 
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because others are laughing, for, like embarrassment, laughter is 
contagious; we also laugh to connect with other laughers, some of 
whom might be together with us, some of whom are just sharing 
space with us, but a space defined as one in which laughing is 
supposed to take place: a comedy club, a movie, a lecture. And we 
laugh because we have precommitted ourselves to it: we have gone 
to the video store to rent a comedy because we want to laugh; we 
have paid for tickets to enter the comedy club; we are invested in 
laughing. That the comic is supposed to produce laughter makes it 
easier to laugh. The very label "comedy" cues us to think laughter is 
expected and thus lowers our critical threshold for what is funny. 
Comedians have an even better thing going for them than these 
helpful precommitments and expectations. Much laughter is moti-
vated by social norms that tell us it is inappropriate not to. The 
comedian, after all, is asking us to laugh and we usually oblige him 
because it is easier to do that than not to, easier for us to let him 
maintain his self-respect than embarrass everyone with the truth. 
The comedian, in short, benefits from our tactfulness, our decency, 
our capacity for saving someone else's face when that other has 
jeopardized it by incompetence. That tact is motivated by an une-
ven mixture of fellow-feeling and the desire to save ourselves the 
embarrassment of witnessing and participating in another's failures. 
Sympathy for the poor devil up there partly motivates our concern 
to save him from himself, save him from the humiliation he will 
suffer if he could see himself as we see him, because we can only 
imagine too well what we would feel like if we were being judged at 
that moment by the likes of us. By saving him we hope to save 
ourselves. 
So the unfunny comedian gets his laughs and the moderately 
funny one, like Rupert, gets heartier laughs than, strictly speaking, 
the material deserves because of the added emotional input relief, in 
its strange dance with embarrassment and amusement, gives to 
laughter. But if the social rules that make us save another's face, that 
make us honor his claim to respectful treatment, give the comedian 
one big assist in gaining laughter without regard to any special 
merits of the material, that is fair compensation for the impossible 
situation stand-up comics put themselves in. We usually think that 
the funniest of things, the things that make us laugh the hardest, are 
spontaneous, unpredictable, and most often:i not contrived, but 
''real.,, The bore who pref aces a joke with ''rm going to tell you a 
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joke - it will really make you laugh" has killed the joke before its 
birth and will only get the laughter that tact, sympathy, and normal 
politeness can muster. But that is what the comedian does too. The 
very performance is one big announcement that reproduces the 
hare's exactly, except with one big difference: the bore bores us 
without our consent; we have consented to endure the jokes of the 
comedian and even invested in them. The remarkable thing is that 
an occasional genius does genuinely make us laugh and the ones who 
do usually do so by teaching us something about social norms, the 
same thing I have been trying to do here. 
I consider my account too sweet, too filled with empathetic and 
sympathetic mechanisms or benign ones like embarrassment and 
relief. We also laugh out of contempt, Hobbes's sudden glory again. 
This is sticky stuff. Many comedians try to coopt contempt and 
make themselves the indulgent object of theirs and yours: Woody 
Allen, Rodney Dangerfield, Rupert Pupkin. Their style is to pre-
empt a kind of cold and malicious contempt, the contempt that 
borders on disgust and revulsion, the contempt that we would feel 
for your pretense of thinking you are funny when you are not, with a 
benign contempt, the contempt that often accompanies amusement 
at the antics of animals and kids. 18 Some comedians adopt another 
strategy for dealing with contempt, not being funny on purpose. 
This is a very self-reflexive style which discovers the comic by 
thwarting its conventional expectations: the jokes are meant to be 
bad, the timing is meant to be off, the atmosphere meant to be 
something less than convivial. The skill here is in signaling conven-
tional competence only to undo the expectations arising from it, the 
violation of those expectations constituting the basis for humor. This 
style can also indulge a kind of self-loathing, a contempt for the 
stock-in-trade of being a comedian in the conventional mode. And 
this self-contempt has a way of becoming a malign contempt for 
you. You become the contemptible fool, the butt of his jokes, the 
sucker. But loathing the audience is not unique to this style. One 
suspects it also motivates types like Woody Allen. They might pose as 
sad-sacks, but they let you know that their knowledge and especially 
their self-knowledge is superior to yours and that that is the respect 
in which they differ from you. 
I know. I know. I can take a hint. My account misses so much of 
the experience of laughing at Rupert's monologue or any other 
comedian for that matter. Can it only be a race to see who can hold 
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whom in contempt first? We may indeed have to admit that some 
gentle contempt figures in our laughing at Rupert's monologue, but 
then mostly because Rupert gave us permission to have those feel-
ings. We are laughing with those who are laughing at Rupert, one of 
whom is also Rupert. There is a community formed, a community of 
laughers, and it produces and is produced by amusement and relief 
that he and we survived the threat of our embarrassment at his 
humiliation. Surely my account is partial: what about the simple 
fun, the exhilaration, the feeling of freedom and escape that often 
accompanies the laughter that comedy provokes? And isn't that 
sense of freedom and escape a liberation from the constraints 
imposed upon us by the myriad of social norms that keep us civilized 
if not exactly content, even as those same norms are constraining us, 
in part, to laugh so as to transcend them?19 
Let me make one final observation. The discomforts of failed 
attempts to elicit our laughter seem to be remarkably resistant to 
variations among visual representational media. Rupert Pupkin can 
make us just as uncomfortable as any real comedian we see fail on 
television or live before us in a comedy club. But if we read bad jokes 
or read cartoons in the newspaper that are not funny we are not 
embarrassed for their author who remains, for us, a disembodied 
name. Instead we have contempt for the people who would find 
such stuff funny. We cannot imagine ourselves as them at all. Thus 
does our imagination limit the objects of our sympathy. We can 
sympathize with someone being laughed at, whatever the reason 
they may be the objects of laughter, but we cannot sympathize with 
the laughers unless we accept the beliefs and the perceptions which 
underpin their laughing. It is thus very hard, if not impossible, to 
sympathize with senses of humor that are not also ours. And nothing 
elicits our contempt quite so easily as laughter we cannot participate 
in. Ultimately the whole array of emotional experiences involving 
the intersection of laughter, the comic, social ineptitude and the 
emotions it evokes depends on a capacity for imagining ourselves in 
the other's shoes while we at the same time remain in ours; in effect, 
we achieve a kind of double consciousness, one part feeling vicari-
ously what we judge the other should feel, the other part feeling as 
we do when we judge the other. And if we are good enough at that 
double vision we should never have to say, "I can take a hint." 
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NOTES 
1 Let me stake out some definitional limits here. I mean to discuss those hints that 
are subsumed in the category that gives the phrase "I can take a hint" its sense, that 
is, hints that are distancing and can thus be perceived by the other as somewhat 
hostile. Although we may give other people hints of encouragement, that is not the 
type of hint I will be dealing with here. In fact, one could conceive of almost any 
kind of social indirection as a hint. But little of analytical value would be gained by 
doing so. Nonetheless, I will have to make some references to a slightly broader class 
of hints in the discussion that follows than that entertained by the notion of the 
hostile hint. 
2The strength of the distancer's right to keep another at bay varies with the moral 
status and the urgency of the seeker's claim. If the seeker is a child, handicapped, 
sick, the distancer maintains his distance at the cost of being thought callous, selfish, 
cruel. 
3See Erving Goffman, "Embarrassment and Social Organization," Interaction 
Ritual: Essays on Face-to-Face Behavior (New York: Pantheon, 1967), 97-112. 
4See William Ian Miller, Humiliation (Cornell University Press, 1993), 159. 
5
"Sudden glory, the passion which maketh those grimaces called laughter and is 
caused ... by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison 
whereof they suddenly applaud themselves." Leviathan I. vi. 
6Both philosophical and psychological literatures generally consider amusement 
an emotion; see Ronald de Sousa, The Rationality of Emotion (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 1990); Robert Sharpe, "Several Reasons Why Amusement is an Emotion," The 
Philosophy of Laughter and Humor, ed., John Morreall (Albany: SUNY Press, 1987). 
7The issue of finding discomfort pleasurable or the witnessing of others' discomfort 
as pleasurable engaged Aristotle and was much discussed by literary theorists of the 
eighteenth century; see Aristotle, The Poetics, and Steele, Tatler No. 82 and Addison, 
Spectator No. 39. Why, for instance, is tragedy pleasurable? Some may find the 
explanation in a kind of commitment to masochism as the chief motivator of human 
psychic life; others may prefer a more complex account of aesthetic emotions. 
8The film was also a box office failure. It exceeded its $14 million production 
budget by almost $5 million. Its American box office take was less than one-sixth that 
amount. See Les Keyser, Martin Scorsese (New York: Twayne, 1992). 
9The coding of Rupert's ethnicity is complex and I relegate some brief observations 
to this note. De Niro's Rupert is not so clearly Jewish as his surname, his nagging 
mother, and his pushy nerdiness would indicate. His Jewishness fades into a kind of 
lower-middle class east-coast ethnic, an amalgam of vulgar Jewish, Italian, and Irish 
styles that itself is the ethnic base of the vulgar showbiz style pilloried in the movie. 
The Jewish predominates in this mix, as one would expect, but it is not the pure 
thing. Nor is this style the fashionable way to self-present Jewishly in a film. Brash 
and pushy confidence, not very self-reflective, as perhaps exemplified in the Marx 
brothers has given way to the self-involved, obsessively self-doubting, wimpy, intel-
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lectualized neuroticism of Woody Allen. Rupert's filmic Jewishness is the old Holly-
wood; he is manifestly dated. 
10See Gary Arnold, "Unroyal 'King': Wrong Tone, Wrong Time in Scorsese & De 
Niro Film," Washington Post (April 15, 1983), Cl, and Marilyn Beck, "The King of 
Comedy," New York Daily News, Feb. 2, 1983, 37. These writers seem to hint that 
Scorsese should take special care given that he must bear some responsibility for the 
production of John Hinckley, Jr., Reagan's failed assassin whose obsession with Jodie 
Foster dated from her appearance in Scorsese's Taxi Driver. See, however, Krin 
Gabbard and Glen Gabbard, Psychiatry and the Cinema (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1987), who suggest that the film's closure may be fantasy. But we 
should never underestimate the American media culture's ability to make such fanta-
sies not quite implausible. Consider the fame of the likes of Oliver North, Amy 
Fisher, the Babbitts, etc. 
11See Keyser, 134-35. Note John Simon's befuddlement (National Review, May 
13, 1983, 574): 
This is where things become particularly muddled. The monologue strikes me 
as only slightly less funny than most such monologues, which I don't find very 
funny either. Are the filmmakers saying that Pupkin's comedy is junk, but that 
on the Langford Show, introduced by Tony Randall, it enchants an audience 
of Pavlovian fools? Or are they saying that Pupkin does have that minimal 
talent needed to make anybody's success in this abysmal business? Is the film 
about weirdos cannibalizing their betters, or are there no betters, and are 
large numbers of-if not, indeed, all-Americans a breed of imbeciles? Is the 
satire specific or all-inclusive? 
12I owe this distinction to a student, Spencer Cusick. 
13See Erving Goffman, Relations in Public (New York: Basic Books, 1971), 
238-47. 
14Grand social theory tends to ignore the crucial but homely questions that the 
social theory of Goffman took as central. Some of these are, do bores get bored by 
bores, boors offended by boors; do nerds have contempt for other nerds? Do we have 
the self-knowledge to know these things? Can they be answered? Since I have been 
from time to time both a bore and a boor I draw on my own experience to suggest 
that evidence warrants answering Yes. About nerds I plead agnosticism, but I suspect 
yes, for the key to all these character types is not the failure to recognize others for 
what they are, but to fail to recognize the content of others' recognition of ourselves. 
15This is not to say it doesn't work well as such a satire. De Niro's genius is given 
more than an able assist by Paul Zimmerman's psychologically and socially rich 
script. Another theme the movie deals with is the failure of any characters to connect 
with any others. All are obsessively self-referential and unwilling to admit the claims 
of others. Thus it is that Masha can never get a letter delivered to Jerry. When she 
gets Jerry's unlisted number, he hangs up (and presumably gets a new number). In 
the end she can only get to him by mummifying him in duct tape and treating him to 
a one-way conversation. Rupert can never get to Jerry; even Jerry can't get through 
to his own people when he calls them with the toy gun to his head, for he is 
indistinguishable from a would-be comedian who does a Langford impression and 
who also plagues Jerry's office. The opening credits roll against Masha's hands 
splayed out against Jerry's car window desperately clawing at the glass shield that, 
like the television screen, separates her TV-idol from her. No one connects. True, 
Rupert and Masha find each other, but as indicated in the text each is contemptuous 
of the other; they are only united by the strange convergence of their psychoses. 
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16It is no wonder that he must struggle to find some place to rest his eyes. Places 
designated as waiting rooms are marked as waiting rooms by having old magazines 
available to ease the awkwardnesses that attend eye-parking. And, as Rupert has 
been told, he is waiting in a reception area, not a waiting room. But again, it is not 
that Rupert is utterly without some inkling of propriety. When he calls Burt Thomas, 
Jerry's producer, after kidnapping Jerry, he shows some awareness that he might not 
have a right as yet to first-name Burt: "No, Burt, if I could call you Bu .... " 
17Jon Elster notes astutely that "although we have different feelings when a disas-
ter just misses us, when a probable disaster fails to materialize and when an unpleas-
ant state of affairs ceases to obtain, the single word relief covers them all. By con-
trast, the corresponding emotions defined with respect to positive core emotions are 
verbally distinguished as regret, disappointment and grief." Nuts and Bolts for the 
Social Sciences (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989). 
18This kind of benign contempt has a dark side to it also. It goes hand in hand with 
some pretty unsavory manifestations of power and hierarchy. It is thus also the 
contempt of the master for the servant, the white for black, the Christian for the 
Jew. But this kind of contempt also has its own reciprocity. The lower-status person 
might as well find the higher-status contemner a worthy object of her own contempt. 
Few of us have either not been the object or the agent of the blistering contempt of 
the black for the white, the Jew for the Christian, women for men, and teenagers for 
adults. The contempt of the high for the low differs in some respects from that of the 
low for the high. The former might involve disgust, but more often is characterized 
by a kind of indifference, a refusal even to see the other. If, as Hume theorizes, 
contempt is a mixture of hatred and pride, then the contempt of the high for the low 
is made more of pride than hatred, whereas in the contempt of the low for the high 
hatred would surpass pride; see David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Bk. II, 
Pt. ii, Sect. x. 
19It is a commonplace that comics elicit laughter by breaking various norms of 
appropriate decorum. Thus Rupert tells about his mom and dad puking, makes jokes 
about his mother's death, and confesses to having kidnapped Jerry to get on the 
show. The mirth generated by watching someone break such norms is complexly 
motivated. There is contempt for the lack of decorum of the comedian vs. admira-
tion for his nerve and insight, nervousness at the breach of deeply held rules vs. 
delight at the feast of misrule aspects of breaking them, relief over not being pun-
ished for breaking them vs. anxiety that we still might be, etc. 
